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Abstract 
 
 
 
The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) is probably the most ambitious self-regulatory project aimed 
at creating a single integrated European digital payments market since the introduction of the Euro. 
SEPA aims to make EU more innovative and competitive. When considering the SEPA initiative and 
combining it with the disruptive and innovative nature the mobile phone permeates, the result is a 
market that is rapidly transforming from well-established into a state of flux. We build a model to 
understand and explain this transformation of the digital payment infrastructure. The model captures 
the formation and development of digital payment infrastructure with a particular emphasis on the 
regulator´s perspective. It consists of four stages characterized by slow incremental change following 
by short rapid bursts of discontinuity. Each stage is portrayed by its evolutionary dynamics, the 
nature of the payment platform, the legal implications, the regulatory asymmetry, the level of 
competition, and what drives the discontinuity. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) is probably the most ambitious self-regulatory project aimed 
at creating an integrated European digital payments market since the introduction of the Euro (Allix et 
al., 2009). The SEPA vision was set out by EU governments in the Lisbon Agenda (2000), which aims 
to make the EU innovative and competitive. Yet it has not received much attention by the few 
researchers in the digital payment area. 
 
The starting point for the SEPA project can be traced back to the adoption of Regulation 2560/2001 
on cross-border payments in Euro which introduced the principle of equal charges for cross-border 
and domestic payments. But the regulation itself was not sufficient to accomplish EU payment market 
integration. Instead the regulation was a clear signal to the banking industry to fill this apparent void 
by introducing technical standards (Janczuk-Gorywoda, 2012). 
 
Simultaneously with the SEPA regulation process the mobile phone is demolishing well established 
business models and associated institutions while paving the way for new. The  mobile phone is 
gradually eroding hard earned concessions and absorbing services that previously were profitable. For 
example consider that the mobile phone is in the midst of absorbing navigation devices (GPS), mp3 
players, and cameras as separate physical objects. The annexation quest of the mobile phone propels 
forward and it has already set its target on digital payment (e.g. Google Wallet, iZettle etc.). 
 
Currently, domestic payment arenas are well established with predefined roles and profitable business 
models. However, there is little doubt that the mobile phone under the auspices of SEPA and the EU 
regulatory initiatives is going to upset this equilibrium by transforming the payment market. So when 
the SEPA changes in the regulatory environment are combined with the apparent disruptive nature of 
the mobile phone the result is a digital payment market that is rapidly transforming from well- 
established into a state of flux. Consequently, in this paper we seek to provide an answer to the 
following eminent research questions facing the payment industry today. 
 
How  to  understand  and  describe  the  formation  and  development  of  digital  payment 
infrastructure from innovator’s and regulator’s perspective? 
 
 
We present our answer as a framework that captures and portrays the formation and evolution of 
digital payment infrastructures. This paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present our theoret ical 
basis. In section 3 we conceptualize our model. In section 4 we discuss the model and its limitations 
and make some conclusions. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS 
 
Our theoretical framework builds upon several different fields of enquiry. We adopt an 
interdisciplinary approach in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the evolution of the digital 
payment market. We analyze the payment systems as multi-sided platforms which main goal is to 
mediate the interaction between several groups of actors. The evolutionary theory helps us explain the 
dynamic of the development and how the different entities move from one stage to the next. The legal 
theory we use sets the rules of the competition and shapes the environment in which the different 
actors co-exist and contest. 
 
Regulation is hard to define (Levi-Faur, 2011). Some understand regulation as rules and function of 
administrative  agencies  after  the  act  of  deregulation,  for  other  regulation  is every kind of rule, 
including primary regulation, secondary legislation and even social and professional norms. Adopting 
the categorization of Julia Black who distinguishes between functionalist, essentialist and 
conventionalists definitions of regulation, this paper follows a functionalist definition which is based 
on the function that regulation performs in society, or what it does (Black, 2002). Therefore our 
understanding  of  regulation  is  strictly  connected  to  the  achieved  effect  (goal),  i.e.  regulatory 
symmetry or asymmetry. 
 
2.1. PAYMENT INFRASTRUCTURE BACKGROUND 
 
In  2002  banks  and  banking associations  established  the  European  Payment  Council (EPC) as a 
decision-making  body  of  the  European  banking  industry  with  the  main  purpose  to  support  and 
promote SEPA. The EPC develops payment schemes (SEPA credit transfer (2008) and SEPA direct 
debit (2009)) and frameworks (SEPA Cards) which help realise the integrated euro payments market. 
The primary role of the ECP is to develop technical standards and business rules for the SEPA 
payment schemes and frameworks which can be found in the SEPA Rulebooks  - a multilateral 
contract which have binding force between payments service providers and between the providers and 
the ECP. The SEPA Rulebooks, which main aim is to achieve inter-operability for cross-border 
payments, bear the main characteristics of a self-regulatory instrument. Introducing open, non- 
proprietary,  and  independent  technical  standards  for  an  integrated  payment  area  would generate 
unprecedented levels of competition. With the open standards it becomes easier for customers to 
switch banks. Customers can also reach other bank accounts in the SEPA using only one bank 
account. 
 
The full implementation of SEPA however, is impeded by the delayed migration efforts by market 
players on both the demand and the supply side as they have struggled to find sustainable business 
case. This led to the introduction of the EU Regulation No 260/2012, which establishes technical and 
business requirements for credit transfers and direct debits in euro, and also defines the deadlines for 
the full migration to the SEPA instruments. The SEPA Regulation also introduces a notable change in 
the European Commission’s strategy to achieve full integration of the payment markets as SEPA is no 
longer viewed as a voluntarily initiative, but rather as a direct regulatory requirement. 
 
2.2 MULTI-SIDED PLATFORMS 
 
A payments system functions as two-sided markets. There is a string of papers which consider the 
payment cards as two-sided platforms that enable the interaction between both merchants and 
consumers (Rochet and Tirole, 2002; Rochet 2006; Evans and Schmalensee, 2007). Thus payment 
platforms show the typical characteristics of two-sided markets, namely network externalities, multi- 
homing costs, “getting both sides on the board”, and specific strategies to charge each group with the 
right price. 
 
Network externalities make larger networks more attractive than small ones (Shapiro and Varian, 
1999). For a particular technology gain momentum a critical mass needs to be achieved. Economists 
define the critical mass as the size of a network which has to be reached before a virtuous self - 
enforcing spiral can be achieved (Economides and Himmelberg, 1995). The critical mass influences 
market dynamics radically. Markets may grow slowly until reaching a critical ma ss, then, suddenly, 
begin expanding rapidly (Osterberg and Thomson, 1998). 
 
The literature has not yet come up with one common definition of multi-sided platforms. Some 
scholars define multi-sided platform as an organization that creates value primarily by enabling direct 
interactions between two (or more) distinct types of affiliated customers (Hagiu and Wright, 2011). 
This definition allows a categorization of American Express, E-Bay and the iPhone as multi-sided 
platforms, but excludes department stores, video game arcades, and movie theaters. Others point out 
that multi-sided platforms create value by bringing two or more different types of economic agents 
together and facilitating interactions between them that make all agents better off (Evans , 2013). 
 
Platform providers can enter new markets by relying either on Schumpeterian innovation i.e. being 
creative and out-competing the old existing system. Or they can enter launching an envelopment 
attack against the incumbents by offering same functionality  and bundling it with their existing 
products (Kazan and Damsgaard, 2013). This paper identifies an additional method which facilitates 
the entrance of new players into a regulated market. The intensifying competition between different 
payment providers leads to regulator’s intervention in order to achieve level playing field for all 
market participants. Thus incumbents (namely banks) are forced to open up (unbundle) their 
infrastructure and guarantee access to the new entrants. The concept of unbundling acc ess draws upon 
access to telecommunication networks where incumbent telecoms operators are forced to make its 
local copper-based network available to other companies through a strict regulatory process (Nardotto 
et al., 2013). 
 
2.3. EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 
 
To capture the dynamics of competing technologies we adopt evolutionary economics which tries to 
explain the nature of the economic change. The evolutionary economics is based on the variation, 
selection and retention mode of evolution (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006; Metcalfe, 1998). The principle of 
evolution  states  that  some  entities  due  to  their  specific  characteristic  are  better  adapted  to 
evolutionary pressure than others. Variety is generated, and then the number of entities in the variety 
is decreased by a selection process (Mayr, 1982). Relation between variation and selection is two - 
way; variety drives selection and the development of variety is shaped by the process of selection 
(Metcalfe, 1994). 
 
The concept of punctuated equilibrium stems from the evolutionary theory. It is largely understood 
that the evolution of species can occur either as gradualism or as punctuated equilibrium.  Change in 
gradualism is slow-paced, whereas in punctuated equilibrium, change comes in spurts, often 
unexpectedly.  Periods  of  very  little  change  (or  incremental  change)  are  followed  by  few  huge 
changes. The concept of punctuated equilibrium is found to be particularly useful for explaining the 
dynamics of technological change (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992; Tushman and Anderson, 1986). 
Technology development is presented as an evolutionary process punctuated by rapid discontinuous 
change. 
 
We clearly observe the phenomenon of existing technologies being used in new application domain 
(in this case digital payments). To explain this we adopt the biological notion of speciation, which 
states that new species evolve when they are isolated from their antecedent population. The analogue 
of speciation in technological development is the application of existing technologies to a new d omain 
of application (Levinthal, 1998; Adner and Levinthal, 2002). Thus we attribute the technological 
discontinuities to re-application of existing technologies in new application domain. 
 
The main principles of the evolutionary theory (variation, selection, retention) are applied to the 
Tushman – Rosenkopf cyclical model of technological change (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). The 
model, which is built upon the punctuated equilibrium theory, has four components: technological 
discontinuities, eras of ferment, dominant designs and eras of incremental change. Although we use 
this model as a basis for developing our model, we introduce some modifications to it. 
 
The Tushman – Rosenkopf model stipulates that a period of change begins with the introduction of 
technological discontinuities. Technological discontinuities are defined as rare, unpredictable 
inventions which advance a relevant technological frontier and which involve fundamentally different 
product or process design (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). In the area of digital payments it is hard to 
attribute the change to rare and unpredictable innovations which result in radical advancement in the 
technology. The technologies which allow the execution of digital payments (e.g. NFC, QR codes, 
etc.) at first were developed and applied to markets other than the payment market. Later, they were 
adopted by the digital payment field but even though they were subjected to some adaptations, we do 
not witness a significant, radical modification of these technologies. Therefore, we cannot attribute 
the technological discontinuities to the development of the technology itself. 
 
In this paper we rely on the evolutionary perspective on dominant designs which focuses on rivalry 
among alternatives. We adopt the concept of the dominant design as a product’s design specifications 
(consisting of a single or a complement of design features) which define the product category’s 
architecture (Christensen et al., 1998). The introduction of new technologies leads to a rapid spread of 
different new designs which co-exist and enter into direct rivalry with old designs. Over the time a 
dominant design emerges. 
 
2.4. INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHISM 
 
This paper adopts the theory on institutional isomorphism which is anchored around the theory of 
technology change. Disruption technologies result in the formation of diverse set of organizations. 
The diversity of the organizational forms is isomorphic to the diversity of the environments (Hawley, 
1968). Diverse environment nurtures diverse forms of organizations. As the diversity in the 
environment diminishes, a specific uniformity in the forms emerges. The concept that best captures 
the process of homogenization is institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powel, 1983). Institutional 
isomorphic  change,  which  focuses  on  the  interaction  between  the  different  populations  of 
organization competing for resources and legitimacy, is mainly attributed to three processes: coercive 
isomorphism, mimetic isomorphism and normative isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powel, 1983). The 
coercive isomorphism resulted from both internal and external pressures exerted on organizations 
from other organizations (including regulators). In this paper we argue that regulations shape the 
environment by exerting coercive pressure on it and pushing it towards harmonization. 
 
The coercive isomorphism serves as a theoretical basis for the construction of our regulatory 
framework which tries to explain the development of the digital payment platforms from regulatory 
perspective.  The  existence  of  legal  pressure  (introduction  of  different  legal  acts,  in  particular 
directives and regulations in the EU) modifies the environment in which organizations operate. We 
argue that the level of legal pressure increases over the time as the digital platforms e volve. 
 
3. CRAFTING THE DPIE MODEL 
 
Following the evolution of the e-payment infrastructure as a two-sided market, we designed a model 
which introduces the regulator’s perspective. Our starting point is the perception that regulation 
addressing emergent technologies is reactive and thus, always a step behind the development of the 
technology in the market. Digital payment is a relatively nascent area of regulatory activities. 
 
The framework has two determinants: level of legal pressure and response of the organizations to the 
environment change. The legal pressure is connected to the regulatory asymmetry/symmetry. The 
higher the level of regulatory asymmetry is, the lower the level of the legal pressure is. The response 
to  the  environment  change  is  proportionate  to  the  level of institutional isomorphism. The more 
uniform the response is, the higher the level of institutional isomorphism is. 
 
The framework is based on the assumption that more control-and-command (or more regulation) after 
the invention phase will lead to higher level of regulatory symmetry. Regulatory symmetry is at the 
core of ensuring level playing field for all the actors operating in the digital payment market. 
Regulatory symmetry provides incumbents and new entrants alike with a level playing field on which 
to compete: same price signals, same restrictions, same obligations (Schankerman, 1996). The 
invention phase is characterized by high level of regulatory asymmetry as opposed to the last phase 
where  a  significant  level  of  regulatory  symmetry  is  established.  In  this  paper  we  assume 
Schankerman’s position that asymmetry does not itself require asymmetric regulation (Schankerman, 
1996).  Rather  we  claim  that  the  asymmetry  stems  from  the  different  legal  requirements  that 
incumbents and new entrants face. 
 
Under command and control regulation (CAC), the regulators fix standards on certain activities (the 
command) and uses legalisation to prohibit the behaviour of the regulated entities which do not 
conform to these standards (the control) (Baldwin, 1997; Black, 2002). There is a consensus among 
different  scholars  that  the  Command-and-Control  approach  is  inapplicable  to  the  new  paradigm 
created by disruptive technologies as it may stifle innovation with unnecessary compliance burden. 
Today, the regulation of emerging technologies is taking place in the 'era of governance' (Dorbeck- 
Jung, 2011). In this paper we assume that Command-and-Control regulation is the opposite of self- 
regulation, co-regulation and soft law. Thus, we adopt the approach followed by Linda Senden who 
distinguishes between traditional and new mode of governance following the ongoing debate about 
the emerging alternative legal forms of governance on EU level (Senden, 2005). 
 
Next we present our model that captures and explains the different phases of infrastructure 
development.  The  model  consists  of  four  stages  of  long  gradual  change  interrupted  by  short 
transitions of rapid and discontinuous change. 
 
3.1. PHASE 1: INVENTION 
 
The invention stage is a period of inventing new technologies or processes. Sometimes this is done 
without a specific application in mind or the invention turns out not to be useful for which it was first 
intended. Many technologies therefore can be characterized as dormant, they have been invented and 
maybe  patented  but  after a few trials it is decided not to continue the development. There are 
numerous examples of this. For example the ATM which was created in 1939 by Luther Simijan. 
After six months of trails the bank reported that there was no need or demand for such a product 
(Barwise at al., 2011). It was not until almost thirty years later, a second attempt to popularize the 
ATM was made and this time the invention became widespread. The genesis of the ATM shows 
common characteristics of inventions as many are invented long before they become widespread. This 
is particularly true for the many inventions that rely on widespread adoption and (de)regulation to be 
firmly established. 
 
In this first phase we have two main stakeholders - incumbents and new entrants (e.g. start-ups 
employing new technologies). There are established payment solutions offered by regulated financial 
institutions (mainly credit institutions). Most of the customers are locked -in the old payment systems. 
The new entrants offer either better alternative solutions or completely new payment solutions. The 
customers, however, are still not locked-in. As a result regulators have no clear mandate to legislate 
because the new technology may not lift–up. It is deemed that the threat posed by the new entrants is 
negligible. 
 
We  define  this  phase  as  a  regulatory  gap  which  is  characterized  by  high  level  of  regulatory 
asymmetry. The asymmetry is further enhanced by the different levels of competitive advantages that 
both incumbents and new entrants enjoy. The incumbent credit institutions have larger consumer 
base, access to established payment network, trust, lawyers and resources etc. which give them a 
significant competitive advantage over the new emerging players. 
 
The new payment service providers have a distinct competitive advantage over regulated financial 
intermediaries as they are not being subject to the regulatory burdens that the incumbents face. 
However, they also face high level of regulatory uncertainty since they do not know what appr oach 
the regulator might take it the future. Therefore there is a high risk that the gained competitive 
advantage may be neutralized by too rigorous regulation introduced at a later stage. 
 
At this stage where many uncertainties are present, regulatory asymmetry is not considered as entirely 
negative characteristic of the invention stage. We argue that the role of the regulator is to find the 
right balance between ensuring innovation and guaranteeing fair competition. Furthermore, regulation 
can be seen as a barrier to entry if the compliance is too high and costly. 
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Figure 1: Digital Payment Infrastructure Evolution 
Phase Launch 
The technology development may be observed before or after the shift of the application domain, but 
the  discontinuity stems from the shift itself. We argue that the shift is caused when a specific 
technology manages to get the attention from institutional actors. An invention, which is applied to a 
specific niche market, is picked up by institutional actor or a company who applies it in other niche. 
This speciation usually results when a technology is taken from one niche and put into another market 
niche. An example of this is the wireless telegraphy which was developed to serve remote locations 
such as lighthouses and ships, but later it entered a subsequent niche of the long-distance transoceanic 
service (Levinthal, 1998). The new technology then has an evolutionary path of its own and can soon 
penetrate an existing mass market. This, however, happens at a later stage. First the technology has to 
exit the originating niche. Niches are seen as incubator rooms where the innovation can evolve 
protected from the mainstream market selections (Hjelholt and Damsgaard, 2013). The institutional 
actors select the particular invention due to the belief that it can support or enhance their position and 
increase their power. After applying the invention in a new niche, the institutional actor can develop 
the technology further or to introduce other improvements before subjecting it to the market selection. 
To exit the niche an institutional actor has to test the market potential of the selected technology. Thus 
the niche innovation is offered as a service in the market often on a trial basis. After such pilot is 
completed, the institutional actor evaluates the results and decided whether to launch the innovation 
or not in the next stage – early commercial launch. Thus the exit of the niche depends on the result 
from the pilot. 
 
The observance of pilot (or trial) in the digital payment framework brings up for  discussion an 
important question. Examples, in particular from the mobile payment services market (Ondurs et al., 
2009), show that many mobile payment services solutions offered as a services in the market on a trial 
basis often fail due to a lack of institutional support from all key players (Dahlberg et al., 2008). 
Many factors are at play here, and we do not try to simplify the process, but we may assume that the 
presence of institutional support in the pilot stage is of critical importance for the fina l success. Then 
one obvious question appears - is the institutional support in the pilot stage a form of selection? The 
short answer is negative. We claim that variation is triggered by the institutional actor or a company 
who decides to shift a specific technology or innovation to a new domain of application. Later this 
technology or innovation is piloted, and then the success of the pilot is attributed to a certain level of 
approval from the same or another institutional actor. The real selection happens in the market field. 
 
3.2. PHASE 2: EARLY COMMERCIAL LAUNCH 
 
The second stage is characterized by the first commercial launch of the service. At the stage most 
digital payment solutions are offered as a single standalone payment instruments or APPs. Theref ore 
the digital payment systems bear the main characteristics of a simple two-sided market.  An example 
for this is the payment cards which need to attract both merchants and cardholders to create cross -side 
network effects (Rochet and Tirole, 2002). 
 
The speciation of various technologies to the payment industry during the previous stage leads to 
variation in the offerings (Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1992). Variation is defined as a change from 
current routines or competencies like founding of new organizations by outsiders of the industry 
(Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). We claim that variation begins after a company decides to shift a specific 
technology or innovation to a new domain of application and offer it commercially. This act spurs 
variation in the new niche. These innovations lead to the emergence of many new entities which enter 
into  an  environment  previously  inhabited  only  by  incumbents  and  thus  giving  rise  to  specific 
variation. It is important to note here that in the digital payment area the variation comes from the 
various existing technologies re-applied to this market from other domains ( NFC, QR, card readers), 
as well as from the institutional actor who choose them (e.g. many new entrants offer NFC-based 
payment solutions in various forms). Therefore, we argue that the variation in the digital payment 
market is two-folded. Thus the variation stage is characterized by new entrants and their co -existence 
with other new entrants and with the incumbents who inhibited the niche before (e.g. the plastic c ard). 
The number of the new entrants is usually growing faster and the interaction with the other actors in 
the environment (new entrants and incumbents alike) is chaotic. 
 
We conclude that the variation stems from the technological discontinuities and con tinues throughout 
the whole phase of the early commercial launch. Variation is put to selection, or to forces which 
significantly reduce the number of entities, in the mainstream market which is characterized by a 
severe competition. We recognize that competition forces are present in the phase of early commercial 
launch, but their severity is limited as the market is still nascent. 
 
The main objective of this stage is to attract users and let them try out the new product/service. A 
popular way to attract first-time visitors is to offer gifts, subsidies or discounts (Damsgaard, 2002). 
Most of the emerging digital payments solutions offer their services for free as part of their freemium 
business model in an attempt to attract as many customers as possible. The critical mass concept has 
very important implications for the competition in the digital payment markets and hence regulation. 
Being able to achieve a critical mass is the threshold for the adoption of a new technology or a 
payment service. If a critical mass is not reached, the specific payment solution just dies out. 
 
Unlike the cyclical model of technological change proposed by Tushman and Rosenkoph, we claim 
that the variation stage is characterized by a certain degree of inertia before the selecti on begins. The 
variation may be initiated by the technological discontinuities, but after this there is a period of 
intensive reorganization within the variation. The reorganization is needed as a form of preparation 
and resource allocation before the selection phase. This claim is consistent with the findings of 
Metcalfe, who argues that there is an element of inertia which holds the competing varieties in a 
stable form for long enough for selection to change their relative importance (Metcalfe, 1998). At this 
stage entities respond quite differently to the imposed environment pressure. 
 
Since the regulator does not have a clear mandate to legislate after the introduction of new 
technologies, the new entrants are left operating in a legal void without clea r guidance to adhere to. 
As a response to this many industry players form self-regulatory bodies which develop a common set 
of standards and business rules applicable to all of its members. The main goal is to gain a cohesive 
voice in the industry and to seek membership with influential bodies which can shape policy-making 
decisions. 
 
SEPA  was  started  as a political initiative which would lead to the integration of the European 
Payment market, and as such it has distinctive political drivers  - EU governments, the European 
parliament, the European Commission and the European Central Bank. However, the 
execution/implementation of SEPA was entrusted to a self-regulatory body, namely the European 
Payment Council. We argue that at this stage SEPA has all the characteristics of a typical self- 
regulation initiative. 
 
Although self-regulation can be seen as a step towards regulatory symmetry as it tries to fill the 
regulatory void, the levels of asymmetry still remain high. We attribute this to the voluntarily natur e 
of the self-regulation which in contrast to regulation does not have binding force. Therefore, the 
decision  to  join  or  not  a  particular  regulatory  initiative  remains  mainly  with  the  companies 
themselves. The asymmetry is also attributed to the uncertain future of the new payment technologies 
and payment services. Until the new technology reaches a critical mass, the levels of competition 
remain low and there is no particular need to regulate it. Before passing the critical mass test the 
future  of  the  new  payment  services  seems  unstable  and  insecure.  Therefore,  the  traditional, 
hierarchical Command-and-control regulation is still not favored at this stage, but rather alternative 
instruments are preferred. This conclusion is aligned with the existing discuss ion about the traditional 
regulation and the emerging new modes of governance. 
 
The successful transition from the early commercial launch phase to the next stage of full commercial 
launch is achieved with the radical change to the business model to make it viable. During the present 
stage companies managed to attract more users and to establish a growing user base but the business 
model was aimed at attracting users and not making a profit. The full commercial launch phase, 
however, is characterized by intensified competition between many platforms each with its own well 
defined user base. As the environment, which companies operate in, has changed, it is expected that 
companies should also change their business models to prepare for the selection phase. 
 
3.3. PHASE 3: COMMERCIAL LAUNCH 
 
In the commercial launch phase payment instruments converge and transform from two-sided into 
multi-sided  platforms.  Payment  cards  are  transforming  from  a  single-purpose  card  to  a  multi- 
functional  card  either  enveloping  or  being  enveloped.  For  example  through  the  use  of  NFC 
technology which is capable of hosting several other contactless applications (e.g. ticketing or loyalty) 
(Kazan and Damsgaard, 2013). At this stage we witness the formation of new platform- based designs 
which co-exist with the old designs. As an example of what we called old payment design are the 
single payment instruments such as the plastic card. On the other hand, there is a proliferation of new, 
more complex designs such as the digital payment platform design (Kazan and Damsgaard, 2013). 
This framework consists of three elements – platform design, technology design and business design 
and defines the digital payment platforms as multi-sided platforms where a payment platform in 
conjunction with physical proxy can host a complimentary application and enter into new markets. 
Commercial launch phase is characterized by intensive competition between incumbents and new 
entrants as well as between new entrants themselves. Different payment solutions fight t o become the 
dominant actor in the market. Often solutions will be in direct competition over the same users or 
costumer (Hjelholt and Damsgaard, 2013). A particular solution will at this point be in constant 
battles with other solutions promoted by actors with other interests (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). 
 
From  evolutionary  economics  perspective,  while  innovation  is  about  creating  new  variations, 
selection puts them to test. Selection reduces the variety by giving preference to some forms of 
variation rather than to others (Aldrich and Ruef, 2006). Competition is selection undertaken in a 
market environment the outcome of which is economic change (Metcalfe, 1998). Selection is tight to 
the concept of Darwinian “fitness” which states that the fittest variatio ns will survive, while the unfit 
ones will perish. In economic terms “fitness” is equalized with economic efficiency. The variations 
which generate profit and can capture a significant market share are deemed fit to be the true winners. 
Defining the unit of selection, or what is to be selected, is the next logical step of our analysis. The 
obvious answer is the solutions which compete for dominance (The incumbents have various line of 
business of which one is digital payments, the same goes for some contenders as well). However, we 
decided to adopt a rather different approach. Objects of selection are not simple elementary traits but 
structures  of  much  higher  dimensions  in  which  they  are  nested.  Market  chooses  complex 
technological systems and not individual elements of technological knowledge (Dosi and Nelson, 
1994). This suggests that markets do not select simple technology as a winner ( e.g. QR codes, NFC), 
but  rather  a  more  complex constructions,  which take into account also the business model, the 
distribution of complementary services (loyalty programs) and customer ownership. 
 
According to the model proposed by Tushman and Rosenkoph the period of intense competition ends 
with the selection of a dominant design which we understand as the specification (consisting of a 
single design feature or configuration of design features) that defines the product category’s 
architecture (Christensen et al., 1998). The end of the battle comes with the establishment of one or 
several dominant designs. Therefore, we witness a significant decrease in the number of solutions in 
the variation. 
 
If in this case the regulatory asymmetry is still present, this legal incoherence can turn out to be a very 
important tool in this battle. The longer a new entrant stayed unregulated after it has reached critical 
mass, the more competitive advantage it will enjoy over its regulated competitors because it is not 
subject to regulatory burdens.  Although the early commercial stage was primarily dominated by self- 
regulation, this mechanism seems to be not very useful in the later commercial launch phase. The 
main reason for this is the fact that self-regulation is not suitable for phases with high level of 
competition  because  of  its  voluntary  nature.  In  this  stage  characterized  by heated  up  battle  for 
dominance the regulatory void due to the lack of any particular CAC regulation can pose significant 
threats to the proper functioning of the market. The role of the regulators here is to ensure consumer 
protection and fair competition (or level playing field for all the actors). This cannot be achieved by 
the EPC alone or by any other self-regulatory association. Therefore the European Commission 
decided to adopt the Payment Service Directive (PSD) in 2007. 
 
The unbundling of the incumbents (introduced by the Proposal for Amendment of the PSD (European 
Commission, 2013b) also aims at making them more innovative. As their main business model is 
challenged, they have to come with more innovative payment solutions and business models in order 
to retain their customer base and to extract more value from it. It is important to note here that the 
unbundling  of  the  old  (or  the  infrastructure  of  the  incumbents)  occurs  right  before  a  new 
infrastructure manifests itself. 
 
The asymmetry, however, is still present as the different payment service providers continue to be 
governed by different rules. The asymmetry stems from the different functions that each of them can 
perform. The asymmetry is furthermore enhanced by the different capital and informational 
requirements that the different service providers face. 
 
3.4. PHASE 4: INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
At the final stage the environment in which organizations operate is constructed in such a way that it 
constraints their ability to change over a significant period of time. This coincides with the era of 
incremental change described in the Tushman-Rosenkoph cyclical model where after initial disruption 
a stable period of slow change is established. 
 
The ability of the winner to innovate is seriously restrained as it cannot fully absorb new inventions 
on a constant basis. The winner has established user base, successful business model and high lock-in 
effects. Therefore, there is little incentive to innovate as the main efforts are focusing on preserving 
the leadership position by retaining the already gained market share. As a result of its victory, the 
winner is granted a concession to establish its own infrastructure. This usually allows the winner to 
exclude other competitors and new entrants from accessing the newly established infrastructure and to 
raise the barriers to entry. 
 
Soft  law  and  self-regulation  both  work  as  preliminary  or  complimentary  stages  of  hard  law 
(Gonçalves and Gameiro, 2008). There are still some doubts about their effectiveness as regulatory 
instruments. They are often designed to promote more participation and dialogue, but sometimes they 
are also perceived as lacking transparency and accountability. This discussion can be seen in the 
evolution of SEPA. In 2013 the European Commission adopted Regulation (EU) No 260/2012 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing technical and business requirements for credit 
transfers  and  direct  debits  in  euro.  The  reason  for  this  decision  is  explained  in  para  5  of  the 
Regulation which states that self-regulatory efforts of the European banking sector through the SEPA 
initiative have not proven sufficient to drive forward concerted migration to Union-wide schemes for 
credit transfers and direct debits on both the supply and the demand side. 
 
We argue that with the adoption of SEPA regulation, the hybrid governance mode of SEPA has 
changed towards more command-and-control regulation. SEPA is no longer a voluntarily initiative, 
but a regulatory requirement (Deutsche Bank, 2012). If a payment service provider provides payment 
services which are credit transfer and direct debit they have to be SEPA compliant. This helps us 
identify the SEPA Regulation as a CAC regulation which is usually defined as hard law. This legal 
mechanism incorporates standards and rules developed as part of self-regulatory process. However, 
due to the inability of the EPC to ensure fast adoption of the SEPA Rulebooks in the countries of the 
SEPA area, a stricter, more hierarchic approach is needed. Thus SEPA regulation ensures a high level 
of regulatory symmetry. 
 
The newly established command and control regulation (SEPA regulation) builds upon the existing 
command and control regulation as it cannot discard it completely. The residual element in the new 
legal regime comes from the existing anti-trust regulations. The main idea behind this is not to allow 
the accumulation of too much market power using new technologies and business models in a way 
that may distort competition. Therefore the anti-trust rules can be seen as additional layers of 
protection. 
 
Regulatory bodies or political institutions see a need for change of the SEPA initiative which was also 
a response of the existing institutions to come up with an alternative through self-regulation. This 
discontinuity period overlaps with and carries on to phase 1 of our model. 
 
4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
In this paper we have built a model that describes and explains the formation and development of 
digital payment infrastructure. To that end we rely on the combination of a number of theories and 
regulatory frameworks namely regulation, multi-sided platforms, evolutionary economics, and 
institutional isomorphism. The key characteristics of our model are summarized in the table below. 
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Figure 2. Overview of key characteristics the digital payment framework 
 
The invention phase triggers a process of speciation where a new product or a service is applied in 
another domain. This disrupts the old domain and leads to an invasion of new entities. The variation 
of companies, which characterizes the early commercial launch, is put down to selection during the 
next stage. In the final phase the selected winner tries to retain its position and to raise the barrier to 
entry for new players. 
 
The level of competition also varies during the different stages of the model.  The invention stage is 
characterized by low level of competition as the new entrants are yet to test the market potential of 
their inventions. Therefore we define the platform as single since the new product or service is still 
developing. As the platform becomes two-sided during the next stage, the level of competition slowly 
rises, but the preference is given to cooperation.  The competition intensifies as the platform matures 
and becomes multi-sided. After the selection the established winner faces low level of competition 
and tries to retain its dominant position by integrating more products or services to the already 
existing payment solutions. 
 
The regulatory gap identified during the invention phase presupposes high level of regulatory 
asymmetry. As different self-regulatory initiatives try to fill the regulatory void, they encompass more 
and more entities and thus decrease the level of asymmetry. The voluntarily nature of these initiatives , 
however,  does  not  guarantee  a  level  playing  field  for  all  the  actors.  Therefore  a  regulatory 
intervention is needed to introduce a set of rules which will facilitate fair competition. As more 
regulatory intervention is gradually introduced, the level of regulatory asymmetry decreases. 
 
Our  key  contribution  is  a  model  in  which  companies  in  the  payment  industry  either  under 
envelopment or launching an envelopment attack can place themselves and plan the best course of 
action. However it is an idealized model and in reality there are many solutions at different sta ges of 
the model. This also indicates that timing the launch of solutions with appropriate type of regulations 
can decide its faith. If it is too late, the regulatory window of opportunity may have shut. If it is too 
early, the incumbents will have the regulatory upper hand in the form of a (de-facto) concession. 
Validation of the model can be achieved by testing its explanatory power in describing historical 
accounts of attempts to establish payment infrastructures. In a more prescriptive mode the model 
could  be  tested  by its  ability to  offer guidelines as what to expect and do next for companies 
jockeying for a position for their solution in the digital payment market. 
 
We encourage others to lift the model away from current niche of digital payment marke t and thereby 
perform a speciation of the model in other domains. The obvious domains are those also victim of the 
mobile phones disruptive march (e.g. the watch or the car or door keys) or domains where the EU is 
also regulating to achieve more innovation and competition. 
 
The lack of any regulation for emerging technologies brings up the question when is the best time to 
regulate  new  entrants?  We  argue  that  regulating new entrants at the stage of invention will be 
counterproductive.  More  regulation  will  mean  higher  compliance  cost,  barrier  to  entry and  less 
innovation. The right moment to regulate is when the entrant has large enough user base (i.e. it had 
passed the critical mass). In this case delayed regulation of entrants seemed to be a good regulatory 
choice. 
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